On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies

Pavlo Prokopovych and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017, vol. 70, issue C, 147-153

Abstract: This paper studies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered. By relaxing the conventional conditions related to upper semicontinuity and single crossing, we enlarge the class of games to which monotone techniques are applicable. The results are illustrated with a number of economics-related examples.

Keywords: Discontinuous game; Strategic complementarities; Better-reply security; Directional transfer single crossing; Increasing correspondence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Related works:
Working Paper: On Strategic Complementarities in Discontinuous Games with Totally Ordered Strategies (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:70:y:2017:i:c:p:147-153

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.007

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