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Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics

Christian Schultz ()

No 03-03, EPRU Working Paper Series from Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper investigates strategic campaigning in a model of redistributive politics in a society with many groups and two parties. Campaigns are informative, and parties can target campaigns to different groups. Voters are uncertain about whether parties favor special groups. The parties will seek to target campaigns at groups where most votes are gained by informing about policies. In equilibrium campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile. These groups will therefore be very well informed about policy and will accordingly be favored by the parties' policies.

Keywords: political economy; redistribution; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2003-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics (2007)
Working Paper: Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics (2003) Downloads
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