Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics

Christian Schultz ()

No 858, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The paper investigates strategic campaigning in a model of redistributive politics in a society with many groups and two parties. Campaigns are informative, and parties can target campaigns to different groups. Voters are uncertain about whether parties fabor special groups. The parties will seek to target campaings at groups where most votes are gained by informating about policies. In equilibrium campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile. These groups will therefore be very well informed about policy and will accordingly be favored by the parties‘ policies.

Keywords: political economy; redistribution; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo_wp858.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics (2007)
Working Paper: Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_858

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().