Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy

Lisandro Abrego and Carlo Perroni

No 99-19, EPRU Working Paper Series from Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: We describe a model of dynamic pollution abatement choices with heterogeneous agents, where, due to the presence of a distributional objective and to the absence of incentive-compatible compensation mechanisms, the choice of a second-best level of emission taxation is time-inconsistent. In this model, we investigate whether investment subsidies can act as a substitute for policy commitment.

References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://web.econ.ku.dk/epru/files/wp/wp9919.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://web.econ.ku.dk/epru/files/wp/wp9919.pdf [301 Moved permanently]--> https://web.econ.ku.dk/epru/files/wp/wp9919.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Investment subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy (2002)
Working Paper: Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy (1999)
Working Paper: Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:epruwp:99-19

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EPRU Working Paper Series from Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics �ster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().