Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy

Lisandro Abrego and Carlo Perroni

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We describe a model of dynamic pollution abatement choices with heterogeneous agents, where, due to the presence of a distributional objective and to the absence of incentive-compatible compensation mechanisms, the choice of a second-best level of emission taxation is time-inconsistent. In this model, we investigate whether investment subsidies can act as a substitute for policy commitment.

Keywords: Pollution Abatement; Emission Taxes; Investment Subsidies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 Q3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp533.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Investment subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy (2002)
Working Paper: Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy (1999)
Working Paper: Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:533

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().