Competition Policy: Publicity vs. Prohibition & Punishment

Stephen Martin (smartin@purdue.edu)

No 1997-02, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics

Abstract: The consequences for market performance of publicity of anticompetitive behaviour and prohibition of anticompetitive behaviour combined with punishment of violators are compared, in a model that also allows for the possibility of entry. Implications for Danish and for international competitive policy are drawn.

JEL-codes: L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 1997-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in: Stephen Martin (ed.): Competition Policies in Europe. Elsevier-North Holland Publ., 1998, pp 105-141

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1997-02

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