Competition Policy: Publicity vs. Prohibition & Punishment
Stephen Martin ()
No 1997-02, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics
The consequences for market performance of publicity of anticompetitive behaviour and prohibition of anticompetitive behaviour combined with punishment of violators are compared, in a model that also allows for the possibility of entry. Implications for Danish and for international competitive policy are drawn.
JEL-codes: L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
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Published in: Stephen Martin (ed.): Competition Policies in Europe. Elsevier-North Holland Publ., 1998, pp 105-141
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1997-02
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