Prisoners’ Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)games
Luca Lambertini ()
No 1997-08, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics
The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners’ dilemma backwards, from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion, and where discount rates appear as the payoffs. Likewise, a prisoners’ dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior (cooperative or non-cooperative) are simultaneously chosen.
Keywords: meta-game; supergame; prisoners’ dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
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Published in: Journal of Economic Theory. November 1997; 77(1): 181-91
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Journal Article: Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)Games (1997)
Working Paper: Prisoners` Dilemma in Duopoly Supergames (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1997-08
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