Subsidizing R&D-Cooperatives

Jeroen Hinloopen

No 1997-15, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics

Abstract: A framework is developed with which both R&D-subsidies and R&D-cooperatives can be analyzed. It is shown that in most cases providing R&D-subsidies is more effective in promoting private R&D than allowing for an R&D-cooperative. Moreover, considering the implementation of both R&D stimulating policies simultaneously reveals that R&D-cooperatives are redundant. The preferred R&D stimulating policy is to optimally subsidize RJVs.

Keywords: R&D-subsidies; R&D-cooperation; Cournot oligopoly; Bertrand oligopoly; spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L43 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1997-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in: De Economist. September 2001; 149(3): 313-45

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1997-15

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics �ster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().