Product market competition policy and technological performance
Stephen Martin ()
No 1998-01, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics
Stricter competition policy reduces expected payoffs before and after innovation, but reduces pre-innovation payoffs relatively more than post-innovation payoffs, and therefore increases the equilibrium level of R&D activity: tough product-market competition policy stimulates innovation. There is an inverted-U relationship between competition policy and expected welfare. The model also permits analysis of the effect of R&D spillovers and of alternative R&D cooperation regimes on expected welfare, on R&D efforts, and on the expected time to discovery of a cost-saving innovation.
Keywords: antitrust; innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L40 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in: George Norman, Jacques-François Thisse (eds.). Market Structure and Competition Policy: Game-Theoretic Approaches. Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp 161-190
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.econ.ku.dk/cie/dp/dp_1997-1999/1998-01.pdf/ [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.econ.ku.dk/cie/dp/dp_1997-1999/1998-01.pdf/)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-01
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics ï¿½ster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().