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On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets

Rabah Amir () and Val Lambson

No 1998-06, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics

Abstract: In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that, as the number of firms increases, the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to (i) decreasing industry price and increasing or decreasing per-firm output; and (ii) increasing industry price (and decreasing per-firm output.) In both cases, per-firm profits are decreasing. The analysis relies crucially on lattice-theoretic methods and yields general, unambiguous and easily interpretable conclusions of a global nature. As a byproduct of independent interest, new insight into existence of Cournot equilibrium is developed.

Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; quasi-competitiveness; supermodular games; equilibrium comparative statics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1998-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

Published in: Review of Economic Studies. April 2000; 67(2): 235-54

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Journal Article: On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets (2000) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-06

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