An Asymmetric Model of Spatial Competition
Guillaume Hollard
No 1998-12, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics
Abstract:
This paper explores a generalized spatial voting model in which parties are not supposed to be identical before the game. This new approach to the political market leads to substantial changes in parties' strategies. Our model provides new explanations of why parties may choose non median policies, i.e. other than that preferred by the median voter. It also provides explanations on why elections may not lead to close races.
Keywords: spacial voting; retrospective voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1998-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-12
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