Temporary Partnerships as an Information Transmission Mechanism: Foreign Investment in Emerging Markets

Peter Møllgaard and Per Overgaard ()

No 1998-13, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics

Abstract: Asymmetric inforation and fear of acquiring a “lemon” may explain the paucity of foreign investment in emerging market economies. If investors are uncertain about the profitability of investments, intrinsically inefficient, temporary partnerships or joint ventures may serve as mechanisms through which information is transmitted. Temporary partnerships with joint investments by the domestic firm and the foreign investor, together with a buy-out option to the investor, can be used to separate good and bad investment prospects in equilibrium. However, non-revealing equilibria may exist. Implications for foreign direct investment are traced and briefly related to the experience of transition economies.

Keywords: investment; complementary assets; partnerships; joint ventures and licensing; costly signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 F2 L14 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1998-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-13

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