Political Ownership

Morten Bennedsen
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Morten Bennedsen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 1998-17, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics

Abstract: Political involvement in the operation of an enterprises, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. I analyze how the influence externality arising form the interest groups´lobby activities disables the Coase Theorem. Then I proceed to investigate how the allocation of property rights between a government and a group of private owners determines the equilibrium allocation of resources in a firm. In other word, I provide a theory of why ownership matters.

Keywords: ownership structure; influence externally; resource allocation; Coase theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 D78 H11 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1998-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in: Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), June 2000, 559-581

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-17

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