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Morten Bennedsen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen
No 1998-17, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics
Political involvement in the operation of an enterprises, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. I analyze how the influence externality arising form the interest groups´lobby activities disables the Coase Theorem. Then I proceed to investigate how the allocation of property rights between a government and a group of private owners determines the equilibrium allocation of resources in a firm. In other word, I provide a theory of why ownership matters.
Keywords: ownership structure; influence externally; resource allocation; Coase theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 D78 H11 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
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Published in: Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), June 2000, 559-581
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-17
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