Export cartels and domestic markets

Christian Schultz ()

No 1999-04, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper considers the effect of monopoly-promoting export cartels on domestic production. It is argued that export cartels facilitate tacit collusion by monitoring defections more efficiently. This slackesn the incentive constraint of tacit collusion. Optimizing firms competing both in the domestic and export markets will often use the icnreased possiblity for collusion in both markets. A condition is given under which this is the case.

Keywords: export cartels; tacit collusion; multimarket contact (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1999-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 2(3), 223-246, 2002

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Journal Article: Export Cartels and Domestic Markets (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1999-04

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