Sequencing R&D Decisions in a Two-period Duopoly with Spillovers

Madjid Amir, Rabah Amir () and Jim Jin ()
Additional contact information
Madjid Amir: University of Kalsruhe

No 1999-06, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics

Abstract: We compare simultaneous versus sequential moves in R&D decisions within an asymmetric R&D/Cournot model with linear demand (for differentiated products), general R&D costs, and spillovers. Simultaneous play and sequential play (with and without a specified leader) can emerge as appropriate formulations, depending on the ratios of spillover rate over demand cross-slope, but not on R&D efficiency. When at least one ratio is above ½, a sequential solution mitigates competition and leads to higher profits for each firm, and to higher social welfare. When uniquely specified, the stronger firm emerges as the R&D first-mover.

Keywords: R&D spillovers; Cournot duopoly; subgame-perfect equilibrium; endogenous timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1999-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in: Economic Theory. March 2000; 15(2): 297-317

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Sequencing R&D decisions in a two-period duopoly with spillovers (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1999-06

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics �ster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().