Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games

Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Mogens Jensen and Birgitte Sloth ()
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Hans Jørgen Jacobsen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Mogens Jensen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 1999-14, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics

Abstract: We study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone signalling games. The learning process is a development of that introduced by Young for static games extended to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential moves equilibria. If the game has separating equilibria, then in the long run only play according to a specific separating equilibrium, the so-called Riley equilibrium, will be observed frequently. This selection, is stronger than, and only partly in accordance with, traditional selection based on restrictions on "out-of-equilibrium" beliefs.

Keywords: monotone signalling games; intuitive criterion; Riley equilibrium; evolutionary learning; separating equilibrium; pooling equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1998-03, Revised 1999-09
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Published in: Games and Economic Behavior. January 2001; 34(1): 34-63

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Related works:
Journal Article: Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games (2001)
Working Paper: Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games (1999)
Working Paper: Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games (1999)
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