The Competition Law & Economics of Electricity Market Regulation

Peter Møllgaard and Nielsen Claus Kastberg
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Nielsen Claus Kastberg: Copenhagen Economics Aps.

No 2003-04, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics

Abstract: Price correlations are used to delineate the geographic market in two recent Danish electricity cases. They indicate that power generators hold temporally transitory and irregularly intermittent dominant positions. Calculation of the Lerner index reveals that they abused this position. The Danish Competition Authority decided to settle this case by agreement for reasons explained. We finally indicate how economics may be used pro-actively to achieve a better market design.

Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2003-07
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Working Paper: The competition law & economics of electricity market regulation (2003)
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