Repeated Signaling Games
No 2005-07, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics
Although many signaling situations are best interpreted as repeated games, prior research often models them as one-shot games. We analyze a class of repeated signaling games in which the informed player's type is persistent and the history of actions are perfectly observable. In this context a large class of possibly complex sequences of signals can be supported as the separating equilibrium actions of the \strong type" of the informed player. We characterize the set of such sequences. We also characterize the sequences of signals in least cost separating equilibria of these games. We show that these sequences in general have a simple structure. Moreover, many of them involve costly signaling after beliefs become degenerate.
Keywords: signaling games; dynamic games; repeated games; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Repeated signaling games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:2005-07
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