Social Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development
Holger Strulik ()
No 05-16, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics
This paper investigates how social composition affects social conflict and economic development when property rights are unenforceable. Groups follow Markovian strategies for consumption and investment and may also spend effort in an resource appropriation contest. It is shown that conflict prevents investment and growth in a society of symmetric groups. In a society at peace economic growth may occur. Growth, however, is decreasing in the degree of social fractionalization and smaller than it could be under secure property rights. In an economy populated by social groups of unequal size an asymmetric equilibrium exists. A large majority may behave peacefully although continuously challenged by a predatory minority. The rebelridden economy either stagnates or grows at a low rate. Growth is decreasing in the size of the predatory minority and its conflict intensity. A final part extends the analysis towards behavior of non-benevolent social elites.
Keywords: social conflict; social fractionalization; property rights; stagnation; growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D74 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-evo and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Social composition, social conflict and economic development (2008)
Working Paper: Social Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development (2006)
Working Paper: Social Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0516
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