Merging and Splitting in Cooperative Games: Some (Im-)Possibility Results

Peter Holch Knudsen and Lars Peter Østerdal
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Peter Holch Knudsen: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 05-19, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: Solutions for cooperative games with side-payments can be manipulated by merging a coalition of players into a single player, or, conversely, splitting a player into a number of smaller players. This paper establishes some (im-)possibility results concerning merging- or splitting-proofness of core solutions of balanced and convex games.

Keywords: cooperative games; manipulation; Dutta-Ray solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D23 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2005-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0519

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