Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results

Peter Knudsen and Lars Peter Østerdal

International Journal of Game Theory, 2012, vol. 41, issue 4, 763-774

Abstract: Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on merging- and splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Keywords: Cooperative games; Manipulation; Merging; Splitting; Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule; C71; D23; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Merging and Splitting in Cooperative Games: Some (Im-)Possibility Results (2005)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0337-7

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