Social Ties and Coordination on Negative Reciprocity: The Role of Affect

Ernesto Reuben and Frans van Winden ()

No 06-08, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a proposer is matched with two responders. We compare a treatment in which subjects are anonymous to each other (strangers) with one in which responders know each other from outside the lab (friends). We focus on the responders’ decisions, beliefs, and emotions. We find that friends punish the proposer more than strangers, and that they are more likely to coordinate their punishment (without communication). Both punishment and coordination are explained by the responders’ emotional reactions. Furthermore, the responders’ expectations are better predictors of emotions and destruction than their fairness perceptions.

JEL-codes: C92 D63 D74 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2006/0608.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity: The role of affect (2008)
Working Paper: Reciprocity and Emotions when Reciprocators Know each other (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0608

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