Do People Make Strategic Moves? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance

Anders Poulsen () and Michael Roos ()

No 09-06, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: The strategic commitment moves that game theory predicts players make may sometimes seem counter-intuitive. We therefore conducted an experiment to see if people make the predicted strategic move. The experiment uses a simple bargaining situation. A player can make a strategic move of committing to not seeing what another player will demand. Our data show that subjects do, but only after substantial time, learn to make the predicted strategic move. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects.

Keywords: strategic moves; commitment; bargaining; strategic value of information; physical timing effects; endogenous timing; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C90 C92 D63 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cse, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2009/0906.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0906

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics Oester Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().