Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium

Ebbe Hendon, Hans Jorgen Jacobsen and Birgitte Sloth ()
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Ebbe Hendon: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Hans Jorgen Jacobsen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 95-08, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper gives a definition of adaptive learning for extensive form games and provides sufficient conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning sequences to be sequential equilibria.

JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1995-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in: Economic Theory, 1999, 13(1) pp 125-42

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Journal Article: Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9508

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