Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium

Ebbe Groes, Hans JÛrgen Jacobsen and Birgitte Sloth ()
Additional contact information
Ebbe Groes: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, DENMARK
Hans JÛrgen Jacobsen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, DENMARK

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 13, issue 1, 125-142

Abstract: This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment.

JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-12-04
Note: Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: May 28, 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/9013001/90130125.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
Working Paper: Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium (1995)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:13:y:1999:i:1:p:125-142

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().