Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy

Christian Schultz ()

No 96-07, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: An infinitely repeated monetary policy game à la Barro and Gordon (1983) is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game.

JEL-codes: D72 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1996-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in: Oxford Economic Papers, 1996, 48(4) pp 673-80

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Journal Article: Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9607

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