Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy

Christian Schultz ()

Oxford Economic Papers, 1996, vol. 48, issue 4, 673-80

Abstract: An infinitely repeated monetary policy game a la R. Barro and D. Gordon (1983) is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-7653%2819961 ... 0.CO%3B2-F&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
Working Paper: Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy (1996)
Working Paper: Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:48:y:1996:i:4:p:673-80

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Oxford Economic Papers is currently edited by James Forder and Francis J. Teal

More articles in Oxford Economic Papers from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().