RJVs and Price Collusion under Endogenous Product Differentiation

Luca Lambertini (), Sougata Poddar () and Dan Sasaki
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Dan Sasaki: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 97-09, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: The authors characterize the interplay between firms' decisions in terms of either horizontal or vertical product differentiation and their ensuing price behavior, be that collusive or not. They prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms' decisions at the development stage and their intertemporal preferences as well as consumers' willingness to pay. Moreover, the authors prove that firms' R&D decisions have no bearings on collusion stability in the vertical differentiation setting, while cooperation in the development stage destabilizes collusion in the horizontal differentiation setting.

Keywords: RJV; product innovation; cartel stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 1997-07
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Related works:
Working Paper: RJVs and Price collusion Under Endogenous Product Differentiation (1998)
Working Paper: RJVs and Price Collusione under Endogenous Product Differentiation (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9709

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