RJVs and Price collusion Under Endogenous Product Differentiation

Luca Lambertini (), Sougata Poddar () and D. Sasaki

No 666, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: We characterize the interplay between firm's decisions in product development, be it joint or independent, and their ensuing repeated price behaviour, either collusive or Bertrand-Nash. We prove that joint-product development and the resulting lack of horizontal differentiation may destabilise collusion, whilst firms' R&D decisions have on bearings on collusive stability in the vertical differentiation setting.

Keywords: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; NEW TECHNOLOGY; INNOVATIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: RJVs and Price Collusione under Endogenous Product Differentiation (1997)
Working Paper: RJVs and Price Collusion under Endogenous Product Differentiation (1997)
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