EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control

Damien Neven and Lars-Hendrik Röller

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: In this paper, we analyse the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies which assert jurisdictions simultaneously. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. We find that conflict in international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high. Hence, "globalisation" should alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict. In addition, we observe that conflict is less likely to arise between countries of different size and for extreme policy rules (very lenient or very strict) towards dominance.

Keywords: international antitrust; merger control; extra-territoriality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2000-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/00.25.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control (2000) Downloads
Working Paper: Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control (2000) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:00.25

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christina Seld ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:00.25