The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control

Damien Neven and Röller, Lars-Hendrik

No 2621, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In this paper, we analyse the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies that assert jurisdictions simultaneously. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. We find that conflict in international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high. Hence, ?globalization? should alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict. In addition, we observe that conflict is less likely to arise between countries of different size and for extreme policy rules (very lenient or very strict) towards dominance.

Keywords: Merger control; Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control (2003)
Working Paper: The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control (2000)
Working Paper: Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control (2000)
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