Incompletely Informed Policymakers and Trade Policy in Oligopolistic Industries

Mustafa Caglayan () and Murat Usman ()

No 2003_06, Working Papers from University of Liverpool, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study strategic trade policy design when governments are incompletely informed about the market demand. Two symmetric, homogeneous product Cournot firms, one in each country, compete in a third country market. Contrary to what common sense would suggest, we show that if governments are less informed on the stochastic market demand, both countries will be better off. Also contrary to findings in the literature, we show that when the government is partially informed, although quantity controls would be optimal for both high and low levels of demand uncertainty, subsidies are preferred for intermediate levels.

Keywords: Trade Policy; Incomplete Information; Oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2003-06-11
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Journal Article: Incompletely informed policymakers and trade policy in oligopolistic industries (2004)
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