Social Pressure or Rational Reactions to Incentives? A Historical Analysis of Reasons for Referee Bias in the Spanish Football

Stefano Cabras, J Reade and Juan de Dios Tena

No 20189, Working Papers from University of Liverpool, Department of Economics

Abstract: A relevant question in economics is whether cognitive bias can be instigated by social pressure or is it just a rational reaction to incentives in place. Sport, and association football in particular, offer settings in which to gain insights into this question. In this paper we estimate the determinants of the length of time between referee appointments in Spanish soccer as a function of referee decisions in favour of the home and away team in the most recent match by means of a deep-learning model. We do not find strong evidence of an incentive scheme that counteracts well-known home referee biases. Our results also suggest that referees are incentivised to deliver a moderate amount of surprise in the outcome of the game what is consistent with the objective function of consumers and tournament organisers.

Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
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https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/schoolof ... tional-reactions.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Social Pressure or Rational Reactions to Incentives? A Historical Analysis of Reasons for Referee Bias in the Spanish Football (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:liv:livedp:20189

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