Implementation in vNM stable sets

Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi and Riccardo D. Saulle

No 202313, Working Papers from University of Liverpool, Department of Economics

Abstract: We fully identify the class of social choice functions that are implementable in von Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) by a rights structure. A rights structure formalizes the idea of power distribution in a society. Following the so-called Harsanyi’s critique (Harsanyi, 1974), we also study the implementation of social choice correspondences in strict vNM stable sets

Keywords: vNM Stable Set; Implementation; Rights Structures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D02 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2023-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Forthcoming

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https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/schoolof ... N,WP,202313,full.pdf First version, 2023 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Implementation in vNM Stable Set (2022)
Working Paper: Implementation in vNM Stable Set (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:liv:livedp:202313

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