Implementation in vNM Stable Set
Michele Lombardi and
Riccardo D. Saulle ()
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Riccardo D. Saulle: Department of Economics and Management, University of Padova
No 283, "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno"
We fully identify the class of social choice functions that are implementable in von Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) stable set (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) by a rights structure. A rights structure formalizes the idea of power distribution in a society. Following Harsanyiâ€™critique (Harsanyi, 1974), we also study implementation problems in vNM stable set that are robust to farsighted reasoning.
Keywords: stable set; implementation; rights structure; farsightedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D02 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pad:wpaper:0283
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