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Implementation in vNM Stable Set

Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi and Riccardo D. Saulle ()
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Riccardo D. Saulle: Department of Economics and Management, University of Padova

No 283, "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno"

Abstract: We fully identify the class of social choice functions that are implementable in von Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) stable set (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) by a rights structure. A rights structure formalizes the idea of power distribution in a society. Following Harsanyi’critique (Harsanyi, 1974), we also study implementation problems in vNM stable set that are robust to farsighted reasoning.

Keywords: stable set; implementation; rights structure; farsightedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D02 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2022-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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