The Effects of Preference Characteristics and Overconfidence on Economic Incentives

Florian Englmaier

Munich Dissertations in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: This dissertation is a collection of three independent research papers and three chapters with surveys introducing into the respective literature. The first paper analyses the effects of introducing Inequity Aversion in a Moral Hazard Problem, the second paper is about optimal delegation in groups involved in contests, and the third paper is about the optimal delegation decision of firms who can hire possibly overconfident managers.

Keywords: Incentives; Inequity Aversion; Contracts; Strategic Delegation; Overconfidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01-27
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