Level-k reasoning and time pressure in the 11-20 money request game

Florian Lindner () and Matthias Sutter

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-. k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from that in equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions; hence there is, at best, little learning. However, under time pressure, behavior is, perhaps coincidentally, closer to that in equilibrium play. We argue that time pressure evokes intuitive reasoning and reduces the focal attraction of choosing higher (and per se more profitable) numbers in the game.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Published in Economics Letters 3 120(2013): pp. 542-545

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Journal Article: Level-k reasoning and time pressure in the 11–20 money request game (2013)
Working Paper: Level-k reasoning and time pressure in the 11-20 money request game (2013)
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