The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach

Klaus Schmidt ()

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: This article develops a model of privatization using an incomplete contracts approach. We argue that different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm, which in turn affect both allocative and productive efficiency. Privatization is seen as a commitment device of the government to credibly threaten to cut back subsidies if costs are high in order to give managers better cost-saving incentives (a \"harder budget constraint\"). The cost of privatization is that allocative efficiency is distorted.

Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (152)

Published in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1 12(1996): pp. 1-24

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Journal Article: The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:19773

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