Hobbes to rousseau: Inequality, institutions and development

Matteo Cervellati, Piergiuseppe Fortunato () and Uwe Sunde

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: This article studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favourable economic institutions in the form of a state of law and absence of societal conflict arise in equilibrium. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. Efficient oligarchies can emerge and persist supported by the consensus of all groups. A taxonomy of politico-economic equilibria shows the endogenous evolution of institutions depending on economic inequality and natural resource abundance, implying a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and institutional quality.

Date: 2008
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Published in Economic Journal 531 118(2008): pp. 1354-1384

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Related works:
Journal Article: Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions and Development (2008)
Journal Article: Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions and Development (2008)
Working Paper: Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions, and Development (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:20088

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