Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions and Development

Matteo Cervellati, Piergiuseppe Fortunato and Uwe Sunde

Economic Journal, 2008, vol. 118, issue 531, 1354-1384

Abstract: This article studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favourable economic institutions in the form of a state of law and absence of societal conflict arise in equilibrium. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. Efficient oligarchies can emerge and persist supported by the consensus of all groups. A taxonomy of politico‐economic equilibria shows the endogenous evolution of institutions depending on economic inequality and natural resource abundance, implying a non‐monotonic relationship between inequality and institutional quality.

Date: 2008
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02173.x

Related works:
Journal Article: Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions and Development (2008)
Working Paper: Hobbes to rousseau: Inequality, institutions and development (2008)
Working Paper: Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions, and Development (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:econjl:v:118:y:2008:i:531:p:1354-1384

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