Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining

Martin Kocher, Odile Poulsen and Daniel Zizzo

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We experimentally test preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive workers do not take employment of low productive workers into account when making wage proposals, regardless of whether only union members determine the wage or all workers. The level of pro-social preferences is small in the voting game, but it increases if the game becomes an individual allocation task. We interpret this as an accountability effect.

Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare 3 48(2017): pp. 659-678

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Journal Article: Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining (2017)
Working Paper: Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining (2012)
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