Contract enforcement and R&D investment

Michael Seitz and Martin Watzinger

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: Motivated by the differences in innovation across countries, this paper evaluates the role of contract enforcement for R&D investments. We find empirical evidence that weak contract enforcement is associated with lower R&D investment: R&D intensity in an industry increases with the quality of the judicial system. This effect is particularly strong in industries that cannot buy inputs on competitive markets and thus depend more on contracts to acquire inputs. In line with this, we show that contract enforcement is particularly important in industries in which vertical integration is not a viable option.

Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in Research Policy 1 46(2017): pp. 182-195

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