Contract enforcement and R&D investment

Michael Seitz and Martin Watzinger

Research Policy, 2017, vol. 46, issue 1, 182-195

Abstract: Motivated by the differences in innovation across countries, this paper evaluates the role of contract enforcement for R&D investments. We find empirical evidence that weak contract enforcement is associated with lower R&D investment: R&D intensity in an industry increases with the quality of the judicial system. This effect is particularly strong in industries that cannot buy inputs on competitive markets and thus depend more on contracts to acquire inputs. In line with this, we show that contract enforcement is particularly important in industries in which vertical integration is not a viable option.

Keywords: R&D investment; Contract enforcement; Legal institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O30 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:respol:v:46:y:2017:i:1:p:182-195

DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.015

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