Are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions? Field evidence from multistage tournaments

Mario Lackner, Rudi Stracke, Uwe Sunde and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates whether decision makers are forward looking in dynamic strategic interactions and incorporate variations of continuation values in their choices. Using data from professional and semi-professional basketball tournaments, we find that the expected relative strength of a team in future interactions indeed affects behavior in the present. The results also show that the response to changes in the continuation value is stronger if the structure of prizes is convex across stages, if the players are in a decisive game and if the prevalence of free riding within a team is low.

Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 179(2020): pp. 544-565

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Journal Article: Are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions? Field evidence from multistage tournaments (2020)
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