Are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions? Field evidence from multistage tournaments

Mario Lackner, Rudi Stracke, Uwe Sunde and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, vol. 179, issue C, 544-565

Abstract: This paper investigates whether decision makers are forward looking in dynamic strategic interactions and incorporate variations of continuation values in their choices. Using data from professional and semi-professional basketball tournaments, we find that the expected relative strength of a team in future interactions indeed affects behavior in the present. The results also show that the response to changes in the continuation value is stronger if the structure of prizes is convex across stages, if the players are in a decisive game and if the prevalence of free riding within a team is low.

Keywords: Promotion tournament; Multistage contest; Elimination; Forward-looking behavior; Heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268120303358
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions? Field evidence from multistage tournaments (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:179:y:2020:i:c:p:544-565

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.012

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().