Auctioning conservation contracts in thepresence of externalities

Raphael Calel

No 22, GRI Working Papers from Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment

Abstract: Current models of conservation auctions do not permit for the presence of environmental externalities and synergies between bidders. Yet, conservation auctions are usually set up for the very purpose of addressing problems associated with environmental externalities. Clearly, our models do not tell the whole story, and they consequently fail to identify waste and inefficiency in these auctions. This paper shows how externalities between bidders can be incorporated into our models of conservation auctions, and uses this framework to investigate the cost-efficiency of the uniform-price auction when neighbours can bid jointly. Allowing neighbours to bid jointly allows them to internalise these externalities, but also reduces the competitiveness of the auction. The net effect on cost-effciency is ambiguous, so we show how simulation can be used to determine in what circumstances joint bidding can be expected to reduce the payments needed to secure a given amount of ecosystem services.

Date: 2010-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/ ... vation-contracts.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Auctioning conservation contracts in the presence of externalities (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lsg:lsgwps:wp22

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in GRI Working Papers from Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The GRI Administration ().