Experimental comparison between markets on dynamic permit trading and investment in irreversible abatement with and without nonregulated companies

Marc Chesney, Luca Taschini and Mei Wang

No 41, GRI Working Papers from Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment

Abstract: This paper examines the investment strategies of regulated companies in irreversible abatement technologies and the environmental achievements of the system in an inter-temporal cap-and-trade market using laboratory experiments. The experimental analysis is performedunder varying market structures: firstly, in a market where there are exclusively regulatedcompanies and then in a market with the inclusion of subjects not liable for compliance withenvironmental regulations. In line with theoretical models on irreversible abatement investment, the paper shows that regulated companies trade permits at a premium. At the same time, steep fixed per unit penalty for excess emissions effectively prompt investments in irreversible abatement technologies. Further, the paper shows that by contributing to the permit demand and supply, the non-regulated companies improve the compliance rate and facilitate the exchange of permits helping the system to achieve a zero-excess permit position.

Date: 2011-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Experimental comparison between markets on dynamic permit trading and investment in irreversible abatement with and without non-regulated companies (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lsg:lsgwps:wp41

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