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Schwellenwerte im Arbeitsrecht: Höhere Effizienz und Transparent durch Vereinheitlichung

Lena Koller (), Claus Schnabel () and Joachim Wagner ()
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Lena Koller: Chair of Labour and Regional Economics, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg

No 40, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics

Abstract: In Germany, many labour laws and regulations apply only in establishments above a critical size, and usually these thresholds are defined by the number of employees. The existing 160 thresholds are complex and defined inconsistently, making it difficult for firms to obey the law. Moreover, exceeding a threshold may result in costs for the firm such as establishing a work council or paying a penalty for not employing disabled persons. Although the empirical evidence is mixed, some studies suggest that employment growth is dampened my firms avoiding to exceed thresholds. In order to minimize these transaction costs and side effects, we make several suggestions to simplify and unify the threshold regulations.

JEL-codes: J23 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2007-02
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