Risk Aversion and Dynamic Games Between Hydroelectric Operators under Uncertainty
Abdessalem Abbassi (),
Ahlem Dakhlaoui () and
Lota Tamini ()
Cahiers de recherche CREATE from CREATE
This article analyses management of hydropower dams within monopolistic and oligopolistic competition and when hydroelectricity producers are risk averse and face demand uncertainty. In each type of market structure we analytically determine the water release path in closed-loop equilibrium. We show how a monopoly can manage its hydropower dams by additional pumping or storage depending on the relative abundance of water between different regions to smooth the effect of uncertainty on electricity prices. In the oligopolistic case with symmetric risk aversion coefficient, we determine the conditions under which the relative scarcity (abundance) of water in the dam of a hydroelectric operator can favor additional strategic pumping (storage) in its competitor’s dams. When there is asymmetry of the risk aversion coefficient, the firm’s hydroelectricity production increases as its competitor’s risk aversion increases, if and only if the average recharge speed of the competitor’s dam exceeds a certain threshold, which is an increasing function of its average water inflows.
Keywords: Closed-loop Cournot competition; electricity wholesale market; hydropower dams; demand uncertainty; asymmetric risk aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L94 Q25 C61 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-upt
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Working Paper: Risk Aversion and Dynamic Games Between Hydroelectric Operators under Uncertainty (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:creacr:2014-4
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