Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict

Max Blouin and Stephane Pallage

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: We examine the effects of famine relief efforts (food aid) in regions undergoing civil war. In our model, warlords seize a fraction of all aid entering the region. How much they loot affects their choice of army size; therefore the manner in which aid is delivered influences warfare. We identify a delivery plan for aid which minimizes total recruitment in equilibrium.

Keywords: Humanitarian aid; food aid; civil war; warlords; famine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F35 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Journal Article: Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0706

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